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Abstract. This work aims to shed new light on the relation between institutional performance and 
firm dynamics. Considering the Italian manufacturing industry and a panel of 3 years, the authors 
investigate the relation between the time needed by courts to enforce debtors’ obligations and the 
time needed by enterprises to repay their debts. In particular, we test the hypothesis that efficiency in 
settling mortgage foreclosure and bankruptcy cases can affect the creditors’ decision making on ju-
dicial disputes. According to our thesis, inordinately long waiting times to enforce credit rights may 
increase the contractual strength of debtors, further delaying payments. As shown by our results, 
there is a statistically significant positive relation between the enforcement of debtors’ obligations 
and the adopted payment index, confirming the key role of the judiciary in the dynamics of firms. 
Indeed, if the time needed to settle bankruptcy cases decreases by 25%, we can expect the payment 
index to decrease by 1%; while, focusing on foreclosure cases, we can expect the payment index to 
decrease by 2%. The policy implications of these results are rather compelling. Policy makers could 
reform foreclosure and bankruptcy procedures to support national economic growth, without ad-
ditional burden on the public budget. 
Keywords: manufacture industry, payment dynamics, institutional performance, strategic man-
agement, judicial efficiency, insolvency procedures. 
JEL Classification: K12, G33. 
Introduction
The risk of business failure is a relevant topic, with significant effects on the market and soci-
ety. On the one hand, creditors’ rights need to be defended against debtors’ insolvency while, 
on the other hand, the national economic system needs to be supported and its reputation 
protected on the global market. Accordingly, the literature has focused on this topic, prompt-
ing academics and institutions to investigate bankruptcy and to propose new models that can 
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predict enterprises’ default with an even higher level of accuracy (Becchetti & Sierra, 2003). 
The effective use of screening models can significantly reduce information asymmetries be-
tween borrowers and lenders, enhancing the efficiency of the financial intermediation process 
(Psillaki et al., 2010). Moreover, improvements in screening and monitoring techniques are 
a valuable alternative to incomplete contracts, reducing moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981, 1992). However, all these efforts are fruitless without an 
appropriate institutional environment, able to support the enforcement of contractual obli-
gations. 
Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995) suggest that con-
tracts are incomplete if the institutional environment is not efficient, that is to say, con-
tracts are incomplete if they cannot be fully enforced due to the poor quality of institutions. 
Hence, the quality of institutions might act as a disincentive for firms or industries, which 
require relationship-specific investments (Chakraborty, 2016). The economic implications 
of this hypothesis are relevant, as documented in the current literature. Levchenko (2007) 
and Nunn (2007) show that better institutional quality tends to increase a country’s exports, 
while Berkowitz et al. (2006) and Ranjan and Lee (2007) highlight that countries with better 
contract enforcement have comparative advantages in highly differentiated final products. 
Focusing on a reform aimed at facilitating the speedy disposal of civil lawsuits, Chemin 
(2010) finds that an efficient institutional environment leads to fewer breaches of contract, 
encouraging investments and facilitating access to the financial market. Antràs (2003, 2005) 
provides further theoretical guidance on the micro effects of institutions, and suggests that 
contract enforcement can shape the business decisions and trade structures of multinational 
companies.
Starting from this background, our work aims to shed new light on forms of opportunis-
tic behavior and strategic decision making that may arise in case of institutional inefficiency, 
causing one of the parties to adopt alternative forms of resolution and the other to increase 
its contractual strength. In particular, we expect a creditor to be able to collect due sums of 
money in case of debtor’s insolvency based on how efficient courts are in enforcing credit 
rights. Judicial inefficiency can discourage creditors from requesting mortgage foreclosure 
and/or a declaration of bankruptcy, decreasing the opportunity cost of Alternative (non-
judicial) forms of Dispute Resolution (ADR), i.e., those processes that involve third parties 
providing conciliation and/or mediation (e.g., the State or even private facilitators) and assist-
ing in the settlement of conflicts, but without any binding determination (Hann et al., 2019). 
Even more importantly, this inefficiency can increase debtors’ contractual strength and, as 
a result, affect firm dynamics and the structure of markets. This is the main hypothesis put 
forward in this work and its main contribution to the current literature. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The first section presents an over-
view of the literature on judicial efficiency and its impact on economic growth and company 
dynamics. Then, based on the proposed background, we introduce our hypothesis regarding 
the expected impact of judicial inefficiency on contractual obligations. The second section 
illustrates the case study (i.e., the Italian manufacturing industry) and the methodology ad-
opted to test the above hypothesis, as well as the functioning of the Italian procedures in case 
of insolvency (i.e., mortgage foreclosure and bankruptcy). Finally, the third section deals 
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2020, 21(5): 1285–1306 1287
with the results of the empirical analysis, while the last section describes the conclusions of 
our research. 
1. Theoretical background: judicial efficiency and company dynamics
The current literature suggests that judicial efficiency has a positive impact on economic 
growth (Chemin, 2009), influencing both firm dynamics (e.g., Johnson et al., 2002; Dough-
erty, 2014; Lichand & Soares, 2014; Falavigna et al., 2019) and the financial markets (e.g., 
Djankov et al., 2008; Qian & Strahan, 2007; Ponticelli & Alencar, 2016). Consequently, there 
is a great need to improve the supply of justice, by correctly assessing the performance of the 
courts and of the judicial system as a whole (e.g., Falavigna et al., 2018; Silva, 2018; Mattsson 
& Tidanå, 2019; Agrell et al., 2020; Ippoliti & Tria, 2020).
According to Hayo and Voigt (2013), judicial procedures can positively affect a country’s 
economic growth, suggesting that some procedural devices can improve a state’s capacity 
to credibly commit to the promises contained in its laws. Moreover, Hayo and Voigt (2013) 
argue that, by making judicial decision more transparent and judges more accountable to 
the law, more trade and investments are expected to take place, which will, in turn, be re-
flected in higher rates of economic growth. Giacomelli and Menon (2017) show that poor 
contract enforcement can affect firms’ incentives to grow, confirming the evidence collected 
by Fabbri (2010), and their results suggest that reducing the length of judicial proceedings 
by 10% leads to a 2% increase in the average size of local firms. Wang et al. (2014) assert that 
judicial quality can affect firms’ exports through its efficiency in settling business contract 
disputes. In particular, focusing on the Chinese market, they conclude that firms in regions 
with better judicial quality will have a comparative advantage in exporting goods, thanks 
to cost saving from an efficient dispute settlement system. Looking at the Indian market, 
Chakraborty (2016) collects similar results, confirming that judicial quality is a significant 
determinant of higher firm performance in terms of both exports and domestic sales. More 
precisely, Chakraborty (2016) estimates that a 10% increase in judicial quality leads to a 1–2% 
increase in sales by local firms. 
Taking the financial markets into account, Laeven and Majnoni (2005) find that judicial 
efficiency is one of the main drivers of interest rate spreads, implying that improvements in 
judicial enforcement of contracts are critical to lowering the cost of financial intermediation 
for households and firms. In addition, Bae and Goyal (2009) show that banks respond to 
poor enforceability of contracts by reducing loan amounts, shortening loan maturities, and 
increasing loan spreads. In a recent article, Shah et al. (2017) investigate the relation between 
credit rights and judicial efficiency, as well as its influence on firms’ corporate leverage. Their 
results point to the fact that improved efficiency in enforcing these rights makes credit more 
readily available, due to greater loan supply. Focusing on the enforcement of insolvency 
cases (i.e., bankruptcy), Shah and Shah (2016) analyze the relationship between national 
judicial efficiency and the cash holdings of corporations. They argue that efficient judicial 
systems are associated with higher levels of corporate cash holdings, supporting what they 
call the managerial-fear hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, managers believe that im-
provements in judicial efficiency can increase the probability of bankruptcy and loss of their 
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jobs, and they respond to this fear by hoarding extra cash as a buffer against such negative 
outcomes. Drawing on the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), Falavigna and Ip-
politi (2018) gather similar evidence on opportunistic behavior, concluding that the higher 
the judicial inefficiency in enforcing creditors’ rights, the higher the risks taken by managers 
and/or stockholders, due to the perceived lower likelihood of creditors requesting a declara-
tion of bankruptcy. Investigating the legal consequences expected by entrepreneurs in case 
of insolvency, Armour and Cumming (2008) obtain, once again, similar results, showing that 
the relaxation of bankruptcy laws can promote entrepreneurship, since (private) failure risks 
and related social costs are more limited. 
Against this background, we explore the efficiency of courts in enforcing creditors’ rights 
and how this affects the performance of firms and their strategies. More precisely, consider-
ing the Italian judicial system and its laws, we investigate the relation between enforcement 
of creditors’ rights and debtors’ payments. Djankov et al. (2007) assess the enforcement of 
creditors’ rights against defaulting debtors by constructing an aggregate index, with score 
between zero (poor creditors’ rights) and four (strong creditors’ rights). In particular, this 
creditor index takes four measures into account: whether secured creditors are able to seize 
their collateral once a reorganization petition is approved (i.e., whether the court imposes 
an “automatic stay” on assets); whether restrictions must be observed when a debtor files for 
reorganization (e.g., creditor consent), as opposed to debtors seeking unilateral protection 
from creditors’ claims by filing for rehabilitation; whether secured creditors are paid first out 
of the proceeds from liquidating a bankrupt firm or whether third-party claims take priority; 
and whether creditors or an administrator are responsible for running the business during 
reorganization, rather than having the debtor continue to manage the business. This index 
clearly represents the creditors’ difficulties in collecting the sums of money due. Another key 
proxy could be the time required to settle a case of insolvency, which, if particularly long, is 
likely to discourage creditors from taking legal action against the insolvent debtors, ultimately 
leading them to search for alternative approaches. 
In the case of the Italian judicial system and its bankruptcy procedure, creditors may well 
wait for years before obtaining the enforcement of their rights (Rodano et al., 2016; Falavi-
gna & Ippoliti, 2018), and they can expect a low level of enforcement adaptability due to the 
country’s legal origin (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2005)1. This result is even more significant in 
view of the fact that Italian businesses are not secured creditors, i.e., there are other parties 
that have priority in the reimbursement process (e.g., employees). In other words, consider-
ing the Italian market, there is no certainty in insolvency applications and the efficiency of 
the courts in enforcing bankruptcy laws may be a crucial determinant in shaping creditors’ 
strategies. Focusing on Spain, France and the United Kingdom, García-Posada and Mora-
Sanguinetti (2013) collect similar results, suggesting that bankruptcy law has little influence 
on financial distress affecting small firms, since bankruptcy procedures are costlier and lon-
ger than the main alternative judicial procedure (i.e., mortgage foreclosure). Yet, what could 
happen if the alternative judicial procedure for dispute resolution is also inefficient? Is an 
1 According to Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2005), French legal origin countries (e.g., Italy) have low levels of enforce-
ment adaptability, since their judiciaries are less independent from the government than in countries with common 
law tradition, as well as less likely to embrace jurisprudence and base judicial decisions on principles of equity. 
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inefficient form of judicial dispute resolution (e.g., insolvency application and/or mortgage 
foreclosure) the best option for a creditor? Is it admissible to hypothesize that a creditor 
might prefer to search for alternative (non-judicial) means of dispute resolution? Moreover, 
is it admissible to hypothesize that a creditor might prefer to wait a few extra months to ob-
tain the sums due (i.e., postponing the payment deadline) and avoid the related additional 
legal costs, rather than having to wait a few extra years for a lower and uncertain payment? 
Based on these key questions, we introduce our main hypothesis: the performance of 
courts can shape the creditors’, as well as the debtors’, decision-making processes on judicial 
dispute resolution. On the one hand, the debtors can deliberately decide to postpone the 
payment deadline, substituting unsecured debt financing with supplier financing, since the 
institutional system is not able to guarantee the enforcement of suppliers’ rights, at least 
not in the short run. Indeed, a solvent debtor may be unwilling to repay if the gain from 
insolvency is greater than the perceived cost of potential sanctions, which depends mainly 
on the entire set of institutional arrangements governing the credit market, as well as on its 
enforcement by the judiciary (Jappelli et al., 2005). On the other hand, the creditors have no 
other option but to search for alternative (non-judicial) means of dispute resolution, which 
might have unpredictable results, and to keep waiting for their money, thus increasing the 
debtors’ contractual strength. In view of all of the above, we propose the following primary 
hypothesis: 
H1  judicial inefficiency in enforcing credit rights can cause payment deadlines to be post-
poned, supporting the substitution of unsecured debt financing with supplier financing.
Current data can help us establish whether this opportunistic behavior actually exists, 
testing the expected positive relation between the time needed to settle a case of insolvency 
(i.e., mortgage foreclosure and bankruptcy) and an estimated index that is representative 
of payment times. If the proposed hypothesis is confirmed, the economic implications of 
this negative externality could be far-reaching for the whole economy, decreasing the com-
petitiveness of the national system and triggering a cascade effect on the market. This may 
be even truer in the Italian market, with its characteristic structure based mostly on small-
medium enterprises (SMEs). 
2. Methodology and data 
In order to examine the proposed hypothesis, we focus on a specific case study, i.e., the Ital-
ian judiciary and manufacturing industry. On the one hand, the Italian judicial system is one 
of the worst in the European Union in terms of inefficiency in settling civil and penal cases 
(CEPEJ, 2016). On the other hand, the Italian manufacturing industry is one of the most 
important in Europe, with exports to third countries worth billions. This set of circumstances 
provides the opportunity for an interesting case study, which can shed new light on the rela-
tion between contract enforcement and firm dynamics. 
Our empirical strategy relies on two key time variables: the time needed by a court to 
settle a judicial case of insolvency (i.e., legal period, for both mortgage foreclosure and bank-
ruptcy) and a representative proxy for the time needed by a firm to pay a debt (i.e., payment 
period). Controlling for some selected external and internal variables, we test hypothesis H1 
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to determine whether a statistically significant positive relation between these two key time 
variables might exist. To do this, financial and economic information on the Italian manu-
facturing industry and its enterprises (our observations) is drawn from an international da-
tabase (i.e., Bureau van Dijk). After thorough pre-processing of this information, data about 
external conditions are extracted from national databases (i.e., Ministry of Justice and Italian 
Institute of Statistics), and assigned to every observation as key environmental variable. 
2.1. Preprocessing phase and outlier detection
For each enterprise, financial and economic information is extracted from the annual ac-
counts included in the AIDA database (Source: Bureau van Dijk)2. This type of data might 
suffer from inaccuracies due to the digital scanning of the documentation; accordingly, pre-
liminary checks are performed taking some simple rules for the drafting of financial state-
ments into account. For example, we exclude firms with different values in total assets and 
total liabilities, negative values in debts, credits, cash, share capital, reserves, and so on. 
Moreover, following the current literature (Bay et al., 2006; Schreyer et al., 2017), we apply 
the simple measure of the Euclidean norm of annual accounts in order to detect and remove 
anomalous data (Filzmoser et al., 2008). The proposed methodology may be thought of as a 
cluster analysis in which observations in the tails of the distribution are considered outliers 
and, consequently, dropped from the statistical analysis (Soltanolkotabi & Candes, 2012). In 
detail, for each firm the Euclidean norm is computed as:
 2 2 21
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   , 
J
J j
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x v v v
=
= +…+ = ∑  (1)
where x is a vector representing the annual accounts values used in the empirical analysis of 
the firm under observation, and v1, …, vj, are elements of vector x (e.g., x = (trade receivables, 
cash, sales,…)).
Once the norm for each firm is obtained, we look at the Median Absolute Deviation 
(MAD) to detect and then drop the outliers (Leys et al., 2013; Huber, 1981). In addition, we 
perform the computation of the median (M) considering three stratifications: year, industry, 
and size3. As suggested by Miller (1991), the rule for cutting the tails of the distribution is:
 3 3   . 3  . x MM MAD x M MAD or
MAD
−
− < + ±  (2)
After the application of this methodology, the number of observations is reduced by 
8.65%. Table 1 shows the number of observations before and after outlier detection. Note 
2 The annual accounts of Italian businesses are based on the Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 (78/660/EEC) 
and its following amending acts (see https://eur-lex.europa.eu). This financial and economic information is more 
detailed than that required by the International Accounting Standards (IAS), providing the opportunity for a very 
interesting case study. 
3 This work adopts the criteria for size classification suggested by the current legislation (Recommendation 
2003/361/EC and Decreto del Ministro dello Sviluppo economico del 18 aprile 2005). Accordingly, if Total Assets 
are under 2,000,000€/year, the firms are “Micro”; if Total Assets are between 2,000,000€/year and 10,000,000€/year, 
the firms are “Small”; if Total Assets are between 10,000,000€/year and 43,000,000€/year, the firms are “Medium”; 
and finally, if Total Assets exceed 43,000,000€/year, the firms are “Big”. 
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that the final number of observations is determined by the available information. For this 
reason, the numbers indicated in the empirical models (Tables 5, 6 and 7) are lower than 
those proposed in Table 1, which does not exclude the observations with missing values and 
payment time equal to zero.
Table 1. Sample size before and after outlier detection (Italy, 2014–2016)
2014 2015 2016 Total
Before MAD 95,151 99,429 88,362 282,942
After MAD 86,529 90,501 81,439 258,469
2.2. Payment times 
In line with the main goal of the article, the key variable in our analysis is the time needed 
by companies to pay off their debts. Since annual accounts only report economic flows and 
stocks, this information is not directly available and has to be estimated by means of indexes 
usually adopted in this sort of analysis. The current economic literature suggests using the 
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) indexes, which prove useful in estimating the duration of 
the whole production period, starting from the purchase of raw materials to the cashing 
of revenues from sales (Wang, 2019). In particular, we focus on a specific type of CCC: the 
number of days needed to repay operating debts, considering the relationship between such 
operating debts and operating costs in a year (Hiller et al., 2013; Fraquelli et al., 2002; Enqvist 
et al., 2014; Jose et al., 1996). 
Let v1 be the total amount payable to suppliers, v2 the cost of raw materials, consumables, 
and goods, v3 the cost of services, and v4 the cost of use of third-party assets. The payment 
index is estimated as follows:
 
1 1
2 3 4 2 3 4
  360. 
360
v v
Payment time
v v v v v v
= = ×
+ + + +
  (3)
The result is multiplied by 360, as a business usually runs operations for about 360 days a 
year. In this way, the payment index is estimated in days as unit of measurement, representing 
a proxy for the time needed to repay operating debts. According to the proposed approach, 
this index is the ratio between a stock variable (extracted from balance sheets) and the sum 
of flow accounts (extracted from income statements). Specifically, in the denominator, the 
total cost borne during the year is divided by the number of operating days (360), represent-
ing the amount of cost per day (€/days). The numerator refers to the total amount payable to 
suppliers at the end of the year, which does not represent the value of debt contracted during 
the year but the amount of debt still to be covered (€). In light of the previous discussion, 
although it does not correspond to the real number of days of delay, the suggested index can 
be regarded as a proxy for delay in paying operating payables. Moreover, this index may rep-
resent varying degrees of reliance on debt financing, i.e., the results of the empirical analysis 
may be interpreted as indicating that debtors rely more on debt to finance operating costs 
when judicial enforcement is weaker. 
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Table  2 presents some preliminary descriptive statistics, showing the payment index 
by geographical macro areas (NUTS1). It emerges from the results that the estimated time 
needed to repay operating debts increases dramatically moving from the North to the South 
of Italy. 
Table 2. Average payment index by geographical macro areas. Analysis of the whole manufacturing 
industry (i.e., sample of observations: after MAD) – Italy, 2014–2016
Geographical macro area 2014 2015 2016
North West 188 186 169
North East 178 180 165
Center 190 190 162
South 255 249 238
Islands 276 282 254
This estimated payment index is the dependent variable of the empirical analysis in this 
work. Based on the proposed hypothesis, H1, we can expect a positive relation between this 
estimation (i.e., the time needed to repay an operating debt) and judicial performance (i.e., 
the time needed to settle a judicial dispute in case of insolvency). 
2.3. Legal times 
According to the Italian law, there are two formal procedures to settle an insolvency case 
(Stanghellini, 2008; Rodano et al., 2016). The creditors can either initiate a process of mort-
gage foreclosure (i.e., esecuzione forzata), which can target the debtors’ movables or real 
estate, or apply to certify the debtor’s insolvency (i.e., istanza di fallimento); after this pre-
liminary step, the court will enforce their credit rights through a bankruptcy procedure (i.e., 
fallimento)4. Moreover, the debtor can apply for an arrangement with creditors through the 
mediation of the court (i.e., concordato preventivo). Obviously, in the latter case, the creditors 
cannot expect to fully recover the amounts due, but the defaulting debtor may be expected 
to cooperate. 
Under the Italian law, all creditors can engage in a mortgage foreclosure procedure, that is 
to say, all secured and unsecured credits can be enforced by courts through mortgage foreclo-
sure of debtors’ goods (i.e., movable and/or real estate). The main difference between secured 
and unsecured credits revolves around the goods involved in the insolvency procedure. In the 
former situation, there is a specific good that represents the collateral in case of insolvency 
with respect to that specific secured credit, which cannot be involved by other creditors in 
other insolvency procedures (i.e., there is an exclusive right to use that good as collateral for 
a single secured credit). In the latter situation, there are no specific guarantees for unsecured 
credits, i.e., all the remaining debtors’ goods that do not represent a collateral for a secured 
credit can be involved in the insolvency procedure to collect the due amount of money. In 
4 Note that either the debtors themselves or the prosecutors can initiate this procedure (see Legislative Decree 
no. 169/2007). 
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both cases, there is a specific judicial procedure aimed at certifying the insolvency status 
of the debtor (e.g., an unpaid invoice), and an order of payment is then issued by the same 
court (i.e., Decreto Ingiuntivo di Pagamento). After 40 days, if there are no oppositions by the 
debtor and/or the due payment is not made, the aforementioned order is enforceable and the 
foreclosure procedure can start. At this point, the payment of secured credits is facilitated by 
the current procedure, since a foreclosure order is not necessary (i.e., Atto di Pignoramento), 
simplifying the bailiff ’s work and reducing the time needed to collect the due amount of 
money, since the object of the foreclosure has already been identified (i.e., the collateral). 
The alternative approach to foreclosure is bankruptcy, which is largely a debtor-protective 
process and prevents creditors from seizing and selling the debtor’s assets piecemeal, giving 
time to liquidate the debtor in an orderly fashion or, more commonly, sell the business as a 
going concern or reorganize its capital structure. Note that only the biggest companies can 
be involved in bankruptcy procedures. Indeed, according to current regulations, creditors can 
initiate bankruptcy procedures if, and only if, the debtors have assets higher than 300,000.00 
Euro, gross revenues higher than 200,000.00 Euro and total debts higher than 500,000.00 
Euro. On the other hand, all insolvent debtors can be involved in mortgage foreclosure pro-
cedures. For this reason, the numbers indicated in the empirical models with bankruptcy 
procedures (Tables 7) are lower than those proposed in the other models (Table 5 and 6).
The current procedures prescribe that judicial competence for insolvency cases depends 
on the location of either the registered office or the main production facility of the insolvent 
business. The Italian judicial system is currently shaped around three hierarchical levels: 140 
courts of first instance (i.e., Circondari Giudiziari), 25 courts of second instance for appeals 
against the judgments of the previous level (i.e., Corte di Appello)5; and 1 court of third 
instance for appeals against the judgments of the second level (i.e., Corte di Cassazione). 
Therefore, the creditor will apply for a declaration of insolvency or mortgage foreclosure to 
the competent court of first instance, taking the location of the debtor’s registered office or 
production facility into account, and then, if necessary, present an appeal against this judg-
ment to the competent court of second instance. 
Data about the time needed to settle an insolvency case (i.e., mortgage foreclosure and 
bankruptcy) are available from the Italian Ministry of Justice. Referring to the Italian justice 
system between 2014 and 2016, and aggregating these data at the second instance level, 
Table 3 clearly highlights inefficiencies in the current insolvency procedures, as well as the 
heterogeneity existing among macro areas (Jappelli et al., 2005). Considering mortgage fore-
closure, the statistics are disaggregated according to the debtors’ assets (movable or real 
estate). 
According to our data, the time needed for the procedure to enforce outstanding credits 
(i.e., bankruptcy) is on average between 2,000 days (North of Italy) and 4,000 days (South 
of Italy). By looking at the data, the readers can easily understand the issue at hand. In the 
South of Italy, considering mortgage foreclosure, creditors have to wait on average between 
around 1 year (movable) and 7 years (real estate), while, taking bankruptcy into account, 
the waiting time is on average more than 10 years, and the creditors have no guarantee that 
5 Every court of second instance groups together several courts of first instance and is competent for appeals against 
first instance judgments.  
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they will actually receive the sums due. This exceptionally long waiting time may force the 
creditors to search for alternative forms of dispute resolution, avoiding the judicial insolvency 
process, in the hope that the debtors will eventually pay. At the same time, judicial ineffi-
ciency may represent an opportunity for the debtors to extend payment deadlines without 
restraint, substituting unsecured debt financing with supplier financing. These opportunistic 
behaviors can be considered a negative externality that is generated by the inefficiency of the 
enforcement system, with relevant adverse spillover effects on the market.
The time needed to settle a case has been extensively used by academics and is a valid 
measure of judicial performance (e.g., Christensen & Szmer, 2012; Di Vita, 2010; Mitsopou-
los & Pelagidis, 2007). Accordingly, we adopt the time needed to settle a bankruptcy case as 
the key explanatory variable in the empirical investigation of this work. This time represents 
the expected delay in enforcing credit rights by the competent court, which can affect credi-
tors’ decision making and debtors’ opportunistic behavior in financing strategies. 
Note that there are also other measures of credit rights enforcement, such as the one pro-
posed by Djankov et al. (2007) and described in the second section. Their paper investigates 
cross-country determinants of private credit, using data on legal creditor rights and private 
and public credit registries in 129 countries and estimating a creditor’s rights index based 
on four powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, in our case study, we focus 
only on Italy, a single judicial system with the same insolvency law and the same regulations, 
i.e., the same powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy. Within the judicial system under 
investigation, the only element of heterogeneity is the courts’ expected ability to enforce 
credit rights, which we estimate by adopting the time needed to settle these cases as our main 
measure of judicial efficiency. 
2.4. Empirical strategy
Several multiple linear regression models are used to test the proposed hypothesis about the 
Italian manufacturing industry (between 2014 and 2016), adopting a pooled sample of ob-
servations. Moreover, we present the same model adopting panel data – although the dataset 
is rather unbalanced – and the whole sample of observations (i.e., with outliers). These are 
robust checks aimed at supporting causality in our key relation between judicial performance 
and payment dynamics.
Table 3. Average time needed to settle an insolvency case according to judicial procedures (expressed 
in days) – Italy, 2014–2016
Judicial district 
of second instance
Mortgage foreclosure
(movable)
Mortgage foreclosure
(real estate) Bankruptcy
North West 170 1058 2476
North East 155 885 2029
Center 271 1384 2820
South 308 2238 3852
Islands 305 2495 4476
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The dependent variable of these models is the payment index, i.e., the estimated time 
needed to pay a debt by manufacturing companies (i.e., our observations), controlling for 
several external and internal variables. The external variables include: 
 – time needed to settle an insolvency case by the competent court where the firm is 
located (considering both bankruptcy and mortgage foreclosure in different models), 
which is the environmental (judicial) variable of interest;
 – geographical macro areas (NUTS 1) where the firms are located, which are dummy 
control variables introduced in the model to account for different social and cultural 
environments and their heterogeneities;
 – years of annual accounts (i.e., 2014, 2015, or 2016), which are dummy control varia-
bles proposed to capture market trends and macroeconomic fluctuations. 
The internal variables are: 
 – NACE codes at level 1, which are dummy control variables introduced to represent 
the economic activities of the observations;
 – working capital (expressed in thousands of euros), which is a flow representing the 
operating liquidity available to a firm, calculated as the difference between current 
assets and current liabilities;
 – legal forms, which are dummy control variables referring to whether the observations 
are general partnerships (i.e., S.N.C.), private limited companies (i.e., S.R.L.) or public 
limited companies (i.e., S.P.A.);
 – specific features of companies and their ability to innovate, i.e., dummy control varia-
bles indicating whether a company is an “innovative start-up“ or an “innovative small 
medium enterprise”. 
The analysis of working capital is relevant because it represents firms’ self–financing 
(Shubita, 2019; Prasad et al., 2019; Gill et al., 2019). Positive values represent the financial 
solvency of firms in the short term, while negative results mean that some assets are financed 
by current liabilities. Table 4 shows some descriptive statistics of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables.
Table 4. Descriptive statistic of the adopted variables. Analysis of the whole manufacturing industry 
(i.e., sample of observations: after MAD and payment index > 0) – Italy, 2014–2016
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Payment index ψ 252116 4.415 1.542 0.000 10.351
Working capital 252116 –145.906 520.599 –2482.154 999.000
General partnership 252115 0.001 0.023 0.000 1.000
Public limited company 252115 0.087 0.282 0.000 1.000
Private limited company 252115 0.887 0.317 0.000 1.000
Innovative start-up company 252116 0.002 0.049 0.000 1.000
Innovative small business 252116 0.002 0.042 0.000 1.000
Mortgage foreclosure (movable) ψ 252116 5.304 0.426 3.804  7.021
Mortgage foreclosure (real estate) ψ 252116 7.116 0.334 6.041   8.482
Bankruptcy time ψ 252116 7.652 0.466 4.875 8.889
North West 252116 0.363 0.481 0.000 1.000
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
North East 252116 0.290 0.454 0.000 1.000
Center 252116 0.186 0.389 0.000 1.000
South 252116 0.126 0.332 0.000 1.000
Islands 252116 0.036 0.186 0.000 1.000
2014 252116 0.335 0.472 0.000 1.000
2015 252116 0.351 0.477 0.000 1.000
2016 252116 0.313 0.464 0.000 1.000
Note: ψ logarithmic transformation.
The analysis starts with a basic model in which only the external variables are considered 
(Model 1). Then, the internal variables of the observations are added step by step: NACE 
codes at level 1 (Model 2), working capital (Model 3), legal form (Model 4), and specific fea-
tures of the companies (Model 5). Note that we propose three distinct analyses, respectively 
considering mortgage foreclosure (both movable and real estate) and bankruptcy. Obviously, 
taking bankruptcy into account, only the firms that meet the required criteria set by current 
procedures are considered in our discussion. Finally, in order to collect more robust results, 
Model 5 is implemented for each analysis but with panel data and considering the whole 
sample of observations (i.e., with outliers).
3. Results
Following the proposed empirical strategy, adopting a pooled sample of observations, we 
implement several multiple regression models to test hypotheses H1. In detail, Tables 5 and 
6 look at mortgage foreclosure, focusing respectively on movable (Table 5) and real estate 
(Table 6), while Table 7 considers bankruptcy as insolvency procedure. 
All the models are statistically significant, i.e. at least one of the predictors’ regression 
coefficients is not equal to zero (i.e., F statistic test with p value <0.01). As for the final model, 
R-squared is equal to 0.065 in Table 5 and Table 6 (i.e., considering the whole population of 
observations and mortgage foreclosure), while in Table 7 it is equal to 0.226 (i.e., considering 
only the biggest firms and bankruptcy). Therefore, in terms of the micro analysis, between 
7 and 23% of the variance can be explained by the variability of the independent variables. 
Lastly, the robust checks performed confirm these significant results.
Taking diagnostic into account, the proposed models are tested through the pairwise cor-
relation between independent variables and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). In both cas-
es, the results collected are acceptable. Note that the dummy variables “South”, “NACE code 
10 – Manufacture of food products”, “General partnership”, and “2014” are the ones against 
which the model is assessed and the effect is within the constant, i.e. the dummy variables 
are equal to zero by construction. Moreover, it can be seen that the number of observations 
varies depending on the firms that can be involved in the selected insolvency procedures. 
End of Table 4
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3.1. Discussion
Our analysis yields rather interesting results, especially considering the key explanatory vari-
able (i.e., judicial efficiency). All the models show a statistically significant positive coefficient 
for the time needed to settle an insolvency case (i.e., p-value <0.01). In other words, ceteris 
paribus, we cannot reject hypothesis H1 that judicial inefficiency in enforcing current laws 
can cause payment deadlines to be postponed, increasing the debtors’ contractual strength. 
The longer the time needed to settle a case (i.e., the courts’ ability to enforce credit rights is 
more limited), the higher the payment index (i.e., the debtors are able to delay payments fur-
ther and further, substituting unsecured debt financing with supplier financing). Accordingly, 
the debtors rely more on debt to finance operating costs when judicial enforcement is weaker, 
since the perceived expectation of credit rights enforcement by creditors is lower. More pre-
cisely, considering Model 5, if the time needed to settle a bankruptcy case decreases by 25%, 
we can expect the payment index to decrease by 1%; in addition, if the time needed to settle 
a mortgage foreclosure case decreases by the same percentage, we can expect the payment 
index to decrease by 2%. These results are confirmed by several robustness checks (i.e., the 
same regression models with all explanatory variables but considering a panel sample and the 
whole population of observations), further supporting the causality relation between judicial 
enforcement of credit rights and payment dynamics.
Table 5. Multiple regression models, pooled sample with robust standard errors. Analysis of the manu-
facturing industry without outliers (i.e., sample of observations after MAD and payment index > 0), 
considering mortgage foreclosure (movable) – Italy, 2014–2016
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5)
VARIABLES Payment index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Mortgage 
foreclosure 
(movable) ψ
0.0728*** 0.0722*** 0.0650*** 0.0660*** 0.0661***
(0.00898) (0.00900) (0.00878) (0.00875) (0.00875)
2015
–0.0163** –0.0161** –0.0133* –0.0147** –0.0154**
(0.00744) (0.00743) (0.00730) (0.00728) (0.00728)
2016
–0.251*** –0.250*** –0.246*** –0.244*** –0.245***
(0.00798) (0.00798) (0.00778) (0.00776) (0.00776)
North West
–0.340*** –0.333*** –0.378*** –0.355*** –0.354***
(0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
North East
–0.383*** –0.380*** –0.436*** –0.416*** –0.416***
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Center
–0.361*** –0.350*** –0.353*** –0.341*** –0.341***
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113)
Islands
0.142*** 0.131*** 0.135*** 0.130*** 0.130***
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178)
Working capital
–0.000620*** –0.000699*** –0.000700***
(6.14e-06) (6.38e-06) (6.38e-06)
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(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5)
VARIABLES Payment index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Private limited 
company
–0.0701*** –0.0705***
(0.0185) (0.0185)
Public limited 
company
–0.507*** –0.507***
(0.0225) (0.0225)
Innovative start-
up company
0.432***
(0.0552)
Innovative small 
business 
0.0195
(0.0824)
Constant
4.409*** 4.420*** 4.390*** 4.468*** 4.467***
(0.0513) (0.0524) (0.0511) (0.0534) (0.0534)
Observations 252,116 252,116 252,116 252,115 252,115
R-squared 0.016 0.017 0.060 0.065 0.065
NACE codes at 
level 1 (FE) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Table 6. Multiple regression models, pooled sample with robust standard errors. Analysis of the manu-
facturing industry without outliers (i.e., sample of observations after MAD and payment index > 0), 
considering mortgage foreclosure (real estate) – Italy, 2014–2016
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5)
VARIABLES Payment index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Mortgage 
foreclosure (real 
estate) ψ
0.0837*** 0.0878*** 0.0723*** 0.0691*** 0.0697***
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136)
2015
–0.0145* –0.0151** –0.0113 –0.0119 –0.0127*
(0.00755) (0.00754) (0.00742) (0.00740) (0.00740)
2016
–0.257*** –0.258*** –0.251*** –0.248*** –0.249***
(0.00862) (0.00862) (0.00842) (0.00840) (0.00840)
North West
–0.337*** –0.328*** –0.378*** –0.357*** –0.356***
(0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121)
North East
–0.386*** –0.381*** –0.441*** –0.423*** –0.422***
(0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126)
Center
–0.358*** –0.345*** –0.350*** –0.340*** –0.339***
(0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116)
Islands
0.102*** 0.0897*** 0.0999*** 0.0959*** 0.0959***
(0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184)
End of Table 5
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(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5)
VARIABLES Payment index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Working capital
–0.000620*** –0.000699*** –0.000700***
(6.14e-06) (6.38e-06) (6.38e-06)
Private limited 
company
–0.0699*** –0.0703***
(0.0185) (0.0185)
Public limited 
company
–0.507*** –0.506***
(0.0225) (0.0225)
Innovative start-
up company
0.434***
(0.0552)
Innovative small 
business 
0.0180
(0.0824)
Constant
4.202*** 4.180*** 4.223*** 4.330*** 4.325***
(0.102) (0.103) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102)
Observations 252,116 252,116 252,116 252,115 252,115
R-squared 0.016 0.017 0.059 0.065 0.065
NACE codes at 
level 1 (FE) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
Table 7. Multiple regression models, pooled sample with robust standard errors. Analysis of the manu-
facturing industry without outliers (i.e., sample of observations after MAD and payment index > 0), 
considering bankruptcy – Italy, 2014–2016
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5)
VARIABLES Payment index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Bankruptcy 
time ψ
0.0406*** 0.0424*** 0.0371*** 0.0353*** 0.0354***
(0.00911) (0.00914) (0.00889) (0.00888) (0.00887)
2015
0.000690 0.000802 0.00160 0.000251 –0.000111
(0.00787) (0.00787) (0.00772) (0.00770) (0.00770)
2016
–0.209*** –0.208*** –0.202*** –0.201*** –0.202***
(0.00833) (0.00833) (0.00811) (0.00809) (0.00809)
North West
–0.335*** –0.327*** –0.368*** –0.346*** –0.345***
(0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124)
North East
–0.379*** –0.373*** –0.426*** –0.407*** –0.407***
(0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0135)
Center
–0.359*** –0.346*** –0.345*** –0.333*** –0.333***
(0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
End of Table 6
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(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5)
VARIABLES Payment index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Payment 
index ψ
Islands
0.149*** 0.138*** 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.138***
(0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206)
Working capital
–0.000625*** –0.000704*** –0.000704***
(6.35e-06) (6.62e-06) (6.61e-06)
Private limited 
company
–0.0399* –0.0403*
(0.0224) (0.0224)
Public limited 
company
–0.466*** –0.466***
(0.0258) (0.0258)
Innovative start-
up company
0.432***
(0.0865)
Innovative small 
business 
–0.0448
(0.0915)
Constant
4.450*** 4.454*** 4.410*** 4.484*** 4.483***
(0.0750) (0.0759) (0.0739) (0.0764) (0.0764)
Observations 219,856 219,856 219,856 219,856 219,856
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.060 0.065 0.065
NACE codes at 
level 1 (FE) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Accordingly, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a significant relation between judicial 
inefficiency and debtors’ contractual strength, and Figure 1 validates these results even more, 
as it highlights the substitution of unsecured debt financing with supplier financing, depend-
ing on judicial inefficiency (i.e., bankruptcy). Taking 2016 into account and court districts 
as observations (adopting the number of firms as weight), the figure plots the time needed 
to enforce credit rights and the percentage of unsecured debt over the total amount of debt, 
showing a negative statistically significant relation between these two variables (p-value 
<0.01). In other words, the higher the judicial inefficiency, the higher the substitution of 
alternative financing by debtors. 
The other results are quite interesting, too. Examining the macro areas, we can observe 
that companies located in the North of Italy (i.e., North West and North East) and in the 
Center tend to delay payments less than those in the South of Italy (i.e., South and Islands). 
These statistically significant results (i.e., p-value <0.01) are coherent with the current lit-
erature on heterogeneity among Italian geographical macro-areas. As for the year variable, 
only 2016 is statistically significant (i.e., p-value <0.01), indicating shorter delays in that year. 
Coherent results are also found for working capital. All coefficients are negative and sta-
tistically significant (i.e., p-value <0.01), suggesting that an increase in working capital means 
End of Table 7
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that firms have financial resources that they use to repay their debts. So, based on our results, 
if the solvability of firms increases, payment times grow shorter. In other words, companies 
with better working capital will be characterized by lower payment index. Finally, public 
limited companies are more virtuous in payments than the other legal forms (i.e., general 
partnership or private limited company), while being an innovative start up negatively affects 
the time needed to repay debts. 
Figure 1. Substitution of unsecured debt financing with supplier financing.  
Analysis of the manufacturing industry without outliers (i.e., sample of observations  
after MAD and payment index > 0), considering bankruptcy – Italy, 2016
It is worth highlighting that all the collected results are robust. Indeed, even if we increase 
the available information within the models, the coefficients remain statistically significant 
and we cannot observe relevant differences in the estimated signs. Additionally, the coher-
ence of our coefficients is maintained even if the adopted insolvency procedures change. The 
next section proposes some conclusions based on the results illustrated above.
Conclusions
According to the theory of incomplete contracts, the threat of hold-up by one of the contrac-
tors depends both on the incompleteness of contracts and on costs that contractors should 
bear to include all possible “states of the world” (i.e., transaction costs). Moreover, the in-
stitutional environment has to safeguard contractors against opportunistic behaviors by in-
fluencing the business strategies of managers and entrepreneurs. Starting from the current 
knowledge, we shed new light on the key role of institutional efficiency in firm dynamics. 
Based on the results collected, we cannot reject our hypothesis, i.e., that judicial inefficiency 
negatively affects the creditors’ decision to request the intervention of the courts, postponing 
the payment deadline and decreasing the opportunity cost of alternative (non-judicial) means 
of dispute resolution. Nevertheless, the enforcing power of these alternative approaches is 
lower, supporting the debtors’ strategic behavior of substituting unsecured debt financing 
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with supplier financing. This evidence may have significant implications for the whole econ-
omy – and even more so for small businesses, which represent a sizeable portion of the Ital-
ian manufacturing industry. The impact of debtors’ opportunistic behaviors on the financial 
health of small enterprises could be dramatic, greatly reducing their solvability and, in the 
worst cases, driving them out of the market altogether. 
Policy implications concern the opportunity to reform the organization of the courts as 
well as insolvency procedures, increasing judicial efficiency and, consequently, preventing 
hold-ups by the parties to a contract. The proposed approach is coherent with evaluations of 
the Italian judicial system by international institutions, such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, which stress the 
need to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of civil procedures to ensure the smooth 
processing of cases in court. Hence, Italian policy makers should pursue a full reform of 
insolvency legislation, advancing the reorganization process that started in 2005 and 20066. 
Moreover, this reform should be complemented by improvements in related laws to increase 
bank lending, enhancing the likelihood that claims by individual creditors against a debtor 
are met. At the same time, policy makers could work on the so-called informal enforce-
ment mechanism (i.e., reputation). Indeed, when legal enforcement works poorly, firms tend 
invest more in connecting with others to enhance contract enforcement via the reputation 
mechanism; additionally, better informal enforcement improves legal enforcement because 
it reduces firms’ incentives to bribe. Obviously, this set of elements may represent a great 
chance for policy makers to support national competitiveness on the global market, promot-
ing entrepreneurship and removing barriers to entry. Even more importantly, these reforms 
could be implemented without diverting financial resources from other public interventions. 
Despite the validity of the results presented above, our work has some limitations and 
there is room to improve the current analysis. Indeed, we adopt indexes to estimate average 
payment times and our research could be developed further when micro data on payments, 
as well as on alternative (non-judicial) means of dispute resolution, become available. More-
over, depending on data availability, there might be opportunities to further validate the 
proposed interpretation concerning the different degrees of reliance on debt financing, test-
ing whether debtors rely more on debt to finance operating costs when judicial enforcement 
is weaker. Future studies may thus provide policy makers with additional support in this 
reform process, steering the judicial system and its services toward a new age of efficiency.
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